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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
BOOK REVIEW
THE RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
Published by American Law Institute.
American Law Institute, Publishers
St. Paul, Minn. 1942 p.p. xiv, 688. Price $6.00
While the Restatement of Judgements provides a useful addition to Ameri-
can legal bibliography, lawyers using it for the first time may experience some dis-
appointment in discovering that many problems normally classified under the broad
heading of "Judgments" are outside the scope of this volume. Thus most matters
dealing with pleading and practice in proceedings leading to judgments, with
remedies for "appeals," "reversals" or "modifications" of judgments, with the
enforcement of judgments, and with priority or divestiture of judgment liens find
no treatment in this volume. This Restatement is concerned with judgments only
as regards their validity and effect upon subsequent controversies, and it might,
therefore, have been more properly entitled a Restatment of the law of res
adjudicata. Futhermore, rules of res adjudicata are considered only in realtion to
judgments rendered by "courts" in "civil" actions. Accordingly, the work deals with
the effect of "civil" judgments of a justice of the peace and of "Courts of Record";
but the effect of "civil" judgments upon subsequent criminal proceedings, of crim-
inal judgments upon subsequent "civil" proceedings, and of "administrative" deci-
sions is outside the scope of the Restatement. Apart from the failure to distinguish
more specifically between such classifications as "administrative" and "judicial" de-
cisions and to indicate the nebulous boundary between "courts" and "administra'
tive tribunals," no criticism is necessarily intended of this restriction upon the scope
of the Restatement. The ground covered is important enough, and there are under-
standable and practical, if debatable, reasons for this limitation of scope.
Division lines have not always been drawn with full clarity. Section 73, 74
and 75 deal with the effect, under rules of res adjudicata, of "Judgments with re-
spect to property, or in rem."", "judgments as to status," and "judgments with re-
spect to interests in property, or quasi in rem," respectively. Since such judgments
vary in effect from one another and from "personal judgments" it becomes impera-
tive for users of the Restatement to distinguish each from the other. There is, of
course, some attempt to make differentiation. But the perennial controversies which
have raged from time immemorial over the boundaries of these terms suggest the
unlikelihood that the difficulties can be adequately met by a few over generalized
paragraphs (in the Introductory Note just before Section One) which served better
to pose the problem than to dispose of it.
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Can all judgments readily be fitted into these classifications? Is a judgment
capable of only one classification? Are these terms expressive of recognizable and
distinct operative facts, or are they shorthand labels for describing particular results?
May not a particular judgment be delt with as being "in rem" for one purpose,
and "quasi in rein" or "in personarn" for another? May not a judgment be "in'
rem" as to some of thc parties and "quasi in rem" as to others? Is an adjudication
of bankruptcy a judgment "in rem", "quasi in rem" or one as to "status," and is the
answer the same for all purposes? Is a determination of an issue of divisavit vel non
a judgment "in rem" or "quasi in rem"? May it be regarded for some purposes
as "in personam" as between parties to the issue? What is the nature of a decree
changing the name of a corporation or of a person? Is a decree of confirmation of an
executor's account, fixing the estate's assets, the compensation of the executor, the
balance owing by him, and directing him to distribute to specified legatees, a decree
"in remn", "quasi in rem" or "in personam" for all purposes? In an election contest,
how should a decision upholding the claim of one party and determining the right
to emoluments, past and future, be classified? These are some of the questions
that will face at least the annotators of the Restatement, who must decide under
which section to put specific cases. While the treatment to be accorded these classi-
fications has been and is a matter of debate, there are many, perhaps, who will
wish that the Restatement had given specific treatment to individualized situations
(will cases, trustees accounts, bankruptcy cases, etc.) instead of announcing general
rules for "judgments in rem," "quasi in rem," "status," etc. In any event more
specific and detailed discussion of these classifications might have proved useful.
Pennsylvania lawyers may also experience some difficulty in using the chapter
dealing with equitable relief against judgments. While the Restatment recognizes
that many jurisdictions like Pennsylvania employ common law forms for equitable
relief, much of what is said about the proceedings by which relief is given and the
nature of the rtlief (see e. g., section 113) will not have too familiar a ring for
Pennsylvanians who almost invariably employ the expedient of a rule to open judg-
ment in attacking prior adjudications. Moreover, since in this state the rule to open
judgment is often used indiscriminately both as an appellate device and as a pro-
ceeding for equitable relief (whereas the Restatement is not concerned with reme-
dies for "appeal") it is often difficult to determine whether in a given case, the
use of the rule to open judgment is in accordance with Restatement rules or not.
Section 33, dealing inter alia with the requirements for jurisdiction for divorce,
cites by cross reference the rules drafted earlier in the Restatement of Conflicts sec-
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tion 113, which in effect followed the ruling of Haddock v. Haddock,1 as amplified
in Davis v. Davis.2 Since the Restatement went to press, however, Haddock v.
Haddock has been overruled by Williams v. North Carolina.3 To that extent, there-
fore, the Restatement of Judgments is unavoidably misleading.
Even with the aforesaid qualifications, the Restatement of Judgments may well
be regarded as the most outstanding contribution to date on the law of res
adjudicata, and it ranks favorably with most of the preceeding volumes published
by the American Law Institute. No work should be deemed the ultimate in any
field, and the Institute would be the last to suggest that consideration on any subject
should end with the Restatement. The Institute does aim to provide a worthwhile
starting pointing from which to launch scholarly, yet practical inquiry into legal




1201 U. S. 562; 26 S. Ct. 525 (1906)
2305 U. S. 32; 59 S. Ct. 3 (1938)
8317 U. S. 387; 63 S. Ct. 207 (1942)
